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Paying Attention 
 
How are the ways we understand subjective experience – not least 
cognitively – being modulated by political economic rationales? And 
how might artists, cultural theorists, social scientists and radical 
philosophers learn to respond – analytically, creatively, 
methodologically and politically – to the commodification of human 
capacities of attention? This theme issue of Culture Machine explores 
these interlinked questions as a way of building upon and opening 
out contemporary research concerning the economisation of 
cognitive capacities. Drawing on and extending work produced for a 
2010 European Science Foundation-funded conference, also 
entitled Paying Attention,1 this special issue proposes a contemporary 
critical re-focussing on the politics, ethics and aesthetics of the 
‘attention economy’, a notion developed in the 1990s by scholars 
such as Jonathan Beller, Michael Goldhaber and Georg Franck.  
This notion – and the related conceptualisations such as of 
‘experience design’, the competition for ‘eyeballs’, ‘click-throughs’ 
and so on – animates contemporary digital media production, 
advertising and the online, multitasking, near-pervasive media 
milieu in which they develop.  
 
If an economy is the means and rationale through which a given 
society commodifies and exchanges scarce resources, then the 
‘attention economy’, following Marazzi (2008), defines human 
attention as a scarce but quantifiable commodity. According to 
Goldhaber (1997) and subsequent critics, this is the techno-cultural 
milieu in which contemporary Western societies operate and in 
which the ‘web-native’ generation lives. In the industrial age the role 
played by the forms of media in coordinating consumption with the 
needs of production was identified and critiqued by prominent 
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members of the Frankfurt School. As Bernard Stiegler (amongst 
others) argues in the wake of Kulturkritik, in the digital era the 
function and impact of the ‘programme industries’ attains a new 
level of influence and penetration with profound potential to 
transform the enabling dynamics of social, cultural and political 
relations, negotiations, and identity formation. In Taking Care of 
Youth and the Generations, Stiegler (2010) announces a battle for 
criticality that must be fought – or, rather, re-commenced – against 
the mainstream adoption of digital technology’s potential visible in 
notions like the attention economy. In response to this call, this 
special issue will both experiment with the concepts, sensibilities and 
methods necessary to attend to the attention economy and attempt 
to understand how substantive examples reveal the contemporary 
bio-political reality of the commodification of our cognitive 
capacities. 
 
Understanding processes of commodification, regulation and 
subjectivation of and through capacities for attention requires that 
we explicitly conceptualise the relation between bodies, cognition, 
economy and culture.  This is precisely the point from which the 
articles in this special issue launch their various critical engagements. 
There are accordingly contributions by Michel Bauwens, Jonathan 
Beller, Bernard Stiegler and Tiziana Terranova. Together, they 
unpack and question the notions of economy and attention and the 
assumptions and implications of their combination. Political 
economic, philosophical and critical theoretical perspectives 
informing critical and activist responses to the predominant global 
mobilisation of attention are laid out and put into dialogue in and 
between these texts. A series of essays from an interdisciplinary 
range of scholars deepens this critical interrogation. These extend 
and elaborate on this dialogue, focussing on particular thematic, and 
(inter)disciplinary issues and drawing on specific digital media case 
studies, including: social networking; the urban governance of 
communal identity; and the inattention paid to the material 
provision of the devices and facilities of ‘immaterial labour’. This 
issue also offers an additional section containing discussion, position 
statements and provocation from more practice-oriented 
contributors. It is a central tenet of this issue’s theoretical agenda 
that critical and creative responses to the forms of digital mediation 
of attention must be composed, in dialogue, and must also mutually 
inflect each other’s development. 
 
In this editorial we contextualise the interrogation of the notion of 
attention as it is mobilised in approaches to the attention economy. 
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In the next section we offer a genealogical reading of the discourse of 
attention and its economies as the theoretical milieu from which this 
issue of Culture Machine proceeds. We bring together what we see as 
some of the key conceptual and discursive waypoints via which the 
critique represented in this issue can be navigated.  To sketch the 
shape of the critique presented by this issue as a whole and to 
introduce the substantive arguments therein, in the concluding 
section of this editorial we offer a thematic outline of the insightful 
and provocative articles that make up this issue. 
 
 
Attending to Attention 
 
There have been several articulations of the commodification of the 
human capacity for attention and the political economic rationales 
for reconstituting capitalism in the locus of the body.  It would be a 
mistake to lionise an originator or moment of inception of this set of 
ideas, but one might look to a range of progenitors: from (post) 
Marxian such as Debord’s (1992) critique of the Society of the 
Spectacle and Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1997) critique of the 
‘Culture Industry’; Edward Bernays’ (1947) psychoanalytically 
inspired development of public relations as a means of ‘engineering’ 
attention, as well as Foucault’s (2008, 2010, 2011) discussion of 
biopolitics and the ‘techniques of the self’. As digital technologies 
arrived in the popular consciousness, in the late 1990s, multiple 
appeals were made to a ‘digital’, ‘information’ or ‘network’ economy 
(for example: Barbrook, 1999; Castells, 1996; Tapscott, 1996) that 
undergird arguments concerning an attention economy. In recent 
literature, a number of scholars have attended to attention variously 
as: an intellectual crisis brought about by the internet (Carr, 2010); 
an issue rooted in the industrial production of moving images 
(Crary, 1992, 2001); as well as a pedagogical concern with regard to 
how young people come to know and care for their society and the 
world (Stiegler, 2010) but also with regard to how we collectively 
negotiate truth through network technologies (for example: 
Rheingold, 2012).   
 
In this introduction we identify four particular, yet related, ways of 
thinking about how attention is commodified, quantified and 
trained. First, the attention economy has been theorised as the 
inversion of the ‘information economy’, in which information is 
plentiful and attention is the scarce resource. Second, post-Marxist 
critics have identified ‘cognitive capitalism’, the enrolment of human 
cognitive capacities as ‘immaterial labour’ par excellence, as the 
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foundation for an attention economy. Third, several continental 
philosophers have identified the cerebral and neural as an object or 
site of politics, with a neural conception of attention becoming, 
particularly for Stiegler, a key issue. Finally, the internet, as a 
mediator of contemporary intellectual and social activities, has been 
identified by popular commentators as a threat to our mental 
capacities, devaluing them, and thus posing a risk to our ability to 
contribute to society.  They are by no means exhaustive, but it is 
betwixt and between these various understandings of an attention 
economy that the discussions within this issue are accordingly 
positioned. 
 
 
The scarcity of attention 
 
The abundance of information, or ‘content’ (that enigmatic 
abstraction of message from medium), ever more available to us via 
an increasing range of media devices, services and systems, sets our 
ability to attend to that information as a scarcity.  In 1971 Herbert 
Simon articulated the issue in terms of ‘information overload’:  
 
[T]he wealth of information means a dearth of 
something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that 
information consumes. What information 
consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the 
attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of 
information creates a poverty of attention. 
(Simon, 1971: 40)   
 
Several evocations of an attention economy were formed at the end 
of the last century, including: Beller (1994), Davenport and Beck 
(2001), Franck (1999) and Goldhaber (1997). The latter three offer 
normatively positive readings of this emergence, while Beller 
(discussed further below) proposed the need for a recalibrated 
critical practice based on a Marxist cultural and political economic 
framework. The paradigm of the commodity adopted in the latter 
formulations invites the assumption that attention has no degree: 
that one either pays attention or does not. Thus, as the capacity for 
attention by a finite audience, a society, is dispersed across a 
broadening range of media, those media command ever decreasing 
‘segments’ of that market. This is the premise for Michael 
Goldhaber’s (1997) argument that ‘the economy of attention – not 
information – is the natural economy of cyberspace’: 
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[O]urs is not truly an information economy. By 
definition, economics is the study of how a society 
uses its scarce resources. […] We are drowning in 
information, yet constantly increasing our 
generation of it. […] There is something else that 
moves through the Net, flowing in the opposite 
direction from information, namely attention. 
(Goldhaber, 1997) 
 
Attention as a commodity, for Goldhaber, endures: it is not a 
momentary circumstance but something that has prolonged effects. 
Thus when attention is garnered it builds a potential for further 
attention in the future: ‘obtaining attention is obtaining a kind of 
enduring wealth, a form of wealth that puts you in a preferred 
position to get anything this new economy offers’. The commodity 
of attention is accordingly a form of property. For Goldhaber, 
attention as ‘property’ leads to the rise of immaterial labour, and the 
lessening of the money economy in favour of some form of 
‘attention transaction’. This ill-defined concept and the 
unsubstantiated claim that ‘disappearance of the involvement of 
capital will be equally the case for attention-getting objects of just 
about any sort’ demonstrates the limits to the proposition of a 
totalising attention economy (Goldhaber, 1997). Where 
Goldhaber’s analysis rings true is in predictions that we would 
increasingly place import upon online social networks and the 
diverse means by which they are accessed – for example: blogs, 
email, Facebook, instant messaging, Twitter.  
 
An understanding of the deluge of media forms as the constitution 
of attention scarcity in the mainstream media sector has significant 
ramifications in the context of education and pedagogy. This is the 
central thesis of Georg Franck’s (1998, 1999) articulation of an 
attention economy founded upon the ‘socialisation of prominence’ 
and the ‘decline of material wealth’. Suppliers technically reproduce 
media content while the audience ‘pay’ through live attention to 
each copy: 
  
Only through this asymmetry is it possible to 
collect such masses of donated attention, which is 
what makes a medium attractive for those 
appearing in it and which allows the media their 
lavishness in conferring the modern peerage of 
prominence. (Franck, 1999) 
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The difference between money and attention for Franck is that in 
addition to an apparent exchange value attention has the corollary 
value of identity. Attention cannot be accumulated in the same ways 
as money but, Franck argues, it can be calculated through ‘esteem’. 
This is accordingly the foundation of the attention economy within 
the academy (unsettlingly close to the model for the British 
Research Assessment Exercise). The aim of education, for Franck, is 
the acquisition and application of knowledge; it is a form of 
capitalized attention that constitutes a ‘mental capitalism’. Indeed, in 
his 2010 conference presentation, Franck argued that this has much 
earlier origins; that, in fact, the enterprise of science has always been 
a continuing production of knowledge value. Thus the attention 
economy is a further development of the industrialisation of a 
‘knowledge society’ (Franck, 2010). It is therefore nothing less than 
the self-consciousness we can afford that depends on an income of 
attention. Franck argues that the power of science can be explained 
as the attempt to gain cultural leadership in the formation of an 
industry dedicated to knowledge production. Thus, in a ‘knowledge 
economy’, the wealth of attention can be wielded as a capital. 
 
The thesis presented by Goldhaber and Franck can be read as a 
restatement of the idea that a media ecosystem delivers attention to 
advertisers and therefore to consumption (Dovey, 2011). Thus, 
attention is rendered equal to time. The advertising metrics of cost-
per-click-through or cost-per-thousand-viewers holds and the 
context or nature of the attention rendered is ignored: as long as the 
quantifiable metric is achieved the cost remains the same (Dovey, 
2011). As Franck attempts to argue, with the increased competition 
for our attention and the suggested decline of the traditional mass 
media monopolies, the quality of attention paid becomes a concern. 
Like Goldhaber and Franck, Thomas Davenport and John Beck 
(2001) argue that there is a transition underway from time as labour 
to time as attention: 
 
Certainly something to which people allot a good 
deal of time in practice can receive minimal 
attention. […] Conversely, a huge amount of 
effective attention can be given to something in a 
small amount of time. (2001: 28) 
 
Attention is implicitly figured in all of these accounts as a largely 
rational, and entirely conscious, capacity. As Davenport and Beck 
suggest: ‘Attention is focused mental engagement on a particular 
item of information. Items come into our awareness, we attend to a 
 
CROGAN & KINSLEY • PAYING ATTENTION                                 CM 13 • 2012 
 
 
www.culturemachine.net • 7  
particular item, and then we decide whether to act’ (Davenport and 
Beck, 2001: 20). An attention economy is therefore not considered 
problematic because the strong causal link implied, the rational 
choice of the economic subject, maintains a semblance of freedom. 
However, once that causality is problematised a range of issues 
opens up concerning the commodification of cognition as such. 
 
 
Cognitive Capitalism 
 
The critiques offered of the account of Homo economicus as rational 
and self-interested and the broader destabilisation, if not dispersal, 
of the stable human subject present an alternative account of the 
attention economy. Attention is embodied as a cognitive capacity, 
expressed not only consciously but also sub-consciously in the 
various ways in which we comprehend and interact with the world. 
Leftist, largely Marxian or post-Marxist, criticism of the apparent co-
opting of capacities for attention by the systems of capitalism have 
variously addressed the industrialisation of attention capture, the 
extension of state apparatuses of control towards cognition, and a 
reaffirmed targeting of the ‘general intellect’ by capitalism. We focus 
on two particular positions adopted here, that of Jonathan, in 
relation to the industrial processes of attention capture through 
screen media, and that of the ‘post-Fordist’ movement, which 
includes the work of Franco Berardi, Antonio Negri, Paolo Virno, 
and in particular Christian Marazzi, concerning the transformation 
of labour into immaterial labour and the destruction of income.  
 
Language lies at the heart of the post-Fordist transformation of 
labour into what Marazzi (2008) calls the ‘New Economy’. 
Marazzi’s thesis is that the distinction between the ‘real economy, in 
which material goods are produced and sold, and the financial 
economy, where the speculative dimension dominates investor 
decisions’ must be reconceived in terms of language as a primary 
creative force (Marazzi, 2008: 14). With the diminution of the value 
of the labour force tied to the growth of the speculative financial 
markets, and the pensions and savings of the workforce also tied to 
those markets, the masses are enjoined to identify their personal 
fortunes (in the fullest meaning of that word) with the success of the 
financial markets: 
  
With their savings invested in securities, workers 
are no longer separated from capital [...] they are 
tied to the ups and downs of the markets and so 
 
CROGAN & KINSLEY • PAYING ATTENTION                                 CM 13 • 2012 
 
 
www.culturemachine.net • 8  
they are co-interested in the ‘good operation’ of 
capital in general. (Marazzi, 2008: 37) 
 
These alliances of speculative capacities and the workforce, 
combined with the promotion of the abstract value of brands 
divorced from products and the growth of immaterial labour, 
identify language ‘not only as a vehicle for transmitting data and 
information, but also as a creative force’ (Marazzi, 2008: 27, original 
emphasis). As machines increasingly perform manual labour, the 
post-Fordists argue that digital technologies ‘change the relationship 
between the intellectual content of work and its material execution’ 
(Berardi, 2001: 51; cited in Marazzi, 2008: 40). There is accordingly 
a devaluation of labour time through the apparently limitless 
expansion of available information, but that ‘limitless growth in the 
supply of information conflicts with a limited human demand’ 
(Marazzi, 2008: 64). The ‘New Economy’ thus has at its heart an 
attention economy. Marazzi argues that this sets in train a move in 
the economy to consume not only work time but also ‘non-
productive’, or leisure, time.   
 
The decrease of leisure time within the attention economy also 
produces a crisis of income because ‘rather than increasing, 
[income] seems instead to diminish […] in relation to the increase 
in the quantity of time dedicated to work’ (Marazzi, 2008: 68). The 
corollary is that if ‘attention time increases then the time dedicated 
to earning a salary inevitably decreases’ (68).  Thus the crisis in the 
‘New Economy’ is its excess: 
  
an economy innervated by communication 
technology needs consumers who have a large 
amount of attention time [and given that] the 
New Economy… consumes not only work time 
but also nonwork time or living time… it follows 
that the crisis of the [attention economy] is 
determined by the contradiction between 
economic time and living time. (Marazzi, 2008: 
146; original emphasis) 
 
The crisis of this ‘excess economy’ lies in the disproportionate 
relation between an ever increasing, and devaluing, sphere of 
information and a diminution of attention time. In a call that 
resonates with the suggestions made in-interview by Michel 
Bauwens in this issue, Marazzi suggests that resistance can be 
offered through the formulation of a ‘biopolitics from below’, 
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ground-up movements to ‘take care of the multitude; that enables it 
to live for itself’ (Marazzi, 2008: 157). 
 
In a 1994 article on cinema as ‘capital of the 20th century’ and in his 
2006 book The Cinematic Mode of Production, Jonathan Beller offers 
an ‘attention theory of value’, developed over the course of several 
years, as a ‘hypothesis of the production of human attention… 
derived from the way in which capital process occupies human time 
in the cinema and other media’ (Beller, 1994: §11). This attention 
theory of value diagnoses, via a Marxian understanding of labour, the 
‘prototype of the newest source of value production under 
capitalism today’, namely ‘value-producing human attention’ 
(Beller, 2006a: 4).  Cinema is the central technical fulcrum around 
which this hypothesis turns: it is cinema that ‘brought the industrial 
revolution to the eye’ (Beller, 2006b): ‘spectators’ practice of 
connecting a montage of images moving in front of them was not 
just analogous but homologous to workers in a factory assembly line 
producing a commodity’ (Beller, 2006b). 
 
In ‘Paying Attention’, an essay published in the same year as his 
book and bearing the same title as its Epilogue, Beller argues that 
‘the media have not just been organizing human attention; they are 
the practical organization of attention… Attention is channeled in 
media pathways that traverse both hardware and wetware’ (2006b). 
Thus for Beller, as for the Post-Fordists, the attention economy not 
only acts in terms of apparently rational practices but also through 
cognition itself, the ‘wetware’ of the brain, as a form of not only 
mental capitalism but also cognitive capitalism.   
 
Beller arrives at a similar political economic concern for cognitive-
linguistic capacities to Marazzi. However, his polemic calls forth a 
dystopian vision of a near total biopolitical subsumption of those 
capacities, understood as Marx’s conceptualisation of ‘general 
intellect’, in capitalist production: ‘We speak, act, think, behave, and 
micro-manage ourselves and others according to the “score” that is 
the general intellect – in short, the protocols or grammar of capital’ 
(Beller, 2006b). The subsuming of the general intellect into the 
protocols of capital is thus the subsumption of humanity. As Patricia 
Clough suggests of Beller’s argument: ‘labour itself becomes “a 
subset of attention, one of the many kinds of possible attention 
potentially productive of value”’ (Clough, 2003: 361 citing Beller, 
1998: 91). The system of production that calls forth this totalising 
attention economy is the industrialisation of image production that 
Beller names ‘cinematization’ (Beller, 2006b). Enframed by our 
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screens, and repressed in that framing, Beller suggests we are on the 
brink of a nightmarish society of the spectacle: ‘in the world of 
paying attention, humanity has become its own ghost’ (2006b). 
However, it is, for some, perhaps not enough to speak in general 
terms about cognition.  For if the embodied nature of this form of 
cognitive capitalism is to be understood as founded in the 
marshalling of the neural and synaptic capacities of the brain, as 
Beller (2006b) alludes with his use of the pseudo-technical term 
‘wetware’, then it follows that we must attend to the brain as a site of 
enquiry. 
 
 
Taking care of brain and spirit 
 
In the last decade there has been something of a ‘neurological’ turn 
in the humanities (Lovink, 2010; Munster, 2011), in which theorists 
have looked to neuroscience to find the specific somatic basis for the 
inter-relation of mind and body and associated concepts such as 
affect. General engagements with neuroscience, popularised by 
neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio (2010) and Marc 
Jeannerod (2002), have gained popular traction and have been 
adopted by a range of scholars in the humanities and social sciences, 
such as Connolly (2002), Malabou (2008) and Rose (2006). There 
have also been adoptions of specific neurological research findings 
both as impetus and justification for arguments (for example: Carr, 
2010; Hayles, 2007; Stiegler, 2010). Three inter-related positions 
are of particular relevance to the work collected in this journal: that 
of Katherine Hayles (2007), whose work in turn is used by Bernard 
Stiegler (2010 and this issue), and that of Catherine Malabou 
(2008). 
 
In a relatively short essay of 2007 Hayles offered a hypothesis of a 
‘generational shift in cognitive styles’ between ‘deep’ attention and 
‘hyper’ attention (2007: 187). The cognitive style of ‘hyper 
attention’, Hayles suggests, evolved first as a means of dealing with 
‘rapidly changing environments in which multiple foci compete for 
attention’ (2007: 188), whereas ‘deep attention’ emerged later, 
largely from pedagogical and scholarly sensibilities, ‘for solving 
complex problems represented in a single medium’ (188). To 
develop her hypothesis Hayles draws upon policy-oriented 
discourses of the pathologies of attention deficit and hyperactivity 
disorder and the study of media technologies (see: Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2005), backed up by broad readings of neuroscience 
(Bear, Connors, & Paradiso, 2007). Hayles argues that this shift in 
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cognitive styles is a pedagogical issue, for it challenges established 
models of teaching and learning. Digital media are both part of the 
problem and part of the solution for Hayles, for 
 
[d]igital media offer important resources in facing 
the challenge, both in the ways they allow 
classroom space to be reconfigured and the 
opportunities they offer for building bridges 
between deep and hyper attention. (Hayles, 2007: 
195) 
 
Taking this argument as one of many impetuses, in a wide-ranging 
argument about attention as a form of care (following Foucault, 
2008), both for the self and for society, Bernard Stiegler adapts 
Hayles’ categories of ‘deep’ and ‘hyper’ attention to identify a 
particular risk to contemporary society. In Taking Care of Youth and 
the Generations Stiegler (2010) announces a struggle for criticality 
that must be re-commenced against the mainstream adoption of 
digital technology’s potential visible in notions such as the attention 
economy. This line of argument has as its basis a system of thought 
that Stiegler has formulated through which we can understand the 
human as a technical being or rather, becoming (see: Stiegler, 1998, 
2009, 2010). Attention, understood in this ontology, is not an 
individual but rather a psychic and social capacity that is historically, 
and thus technically, conditioned: ‘The formation of attention is 
always already simultaneously a psychic and social faculty’ (Stiegler, 
2010: 18). 
 
Drawing on and revising Edmund Husserl’s analysis of internal time 
consciousness, for Stiegler attention accordingly consists of an 
interplay between the interior (psychic) and technical accumulation 
of ‘retentions’, which are the conscious acts of processing the 
passage of time (see Stiegler, 2010: 17-19). This technical 
accumulation is the exteriorisation of memory as ‘tertiary’ 
retentions, whereas primary and secondary retentions are interior to 
the formation of the subject. The fixity of particular ways of 
knowing, as tertiary retention, is understood by Stiegler, following 
Derrida (1997) and the linguist Sylvian Auroux, as grammatisation: 
the processes of describing and formalizing human behaviour into 
representations such as symbols, pictures, words and code, so that it 
can be reproduced. As Crogan has previously explained, ‘grammars’ 
are constructed in this way through which technocultural 
programmes can be instantiated: ‘These are actions, habits, rituals, 
practices that amount to sets and sequences of grammes […] 
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conditioned and channelled by the ensemble of grammars which 
comprise the cultural pro-gram’ (Crogan, 2010: 96 citing Stiegler, 
2009: 72-73; additional emphasis). Grammatisation processes are, 
according to Stiegler, a form of pharmakon. Drawing on Derrida’s 
deconstructive reading of the Phaedrus in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’), 
Stiegler glosses pharmakon as both a poison and a cure – a form of 
recipe, substance or spell (Derrida, 1981). In Phaedrus, Plato uses 
the concept of the pharmakon as a play of oppositions: 
poison/remedy, bad/good, to characterise the ambivalent nature of 
writing as a technique of memorisation. 
 
What might be understood as the biopolitical apparatus of the 
emerging attention economy outlined by Beller and Marazzi – albeit 
from a Marxian perspective – is performed through an 
interiorisation of the attention commodification logic. To 
understand this interiorisation we must, in Stiegler’s view, 
understand its basis in the pharmakon of grammatisation. This is not 
only a formulation of biopower, operating at the level of the body, 
but also of psychopower, operating within mentality and upon the 
brain. This form of power consists in the tendency towards the 
displacement of ‘attentional’ techniques, which produce ‘deep’ 
attention, by industrially mass-produced ‘attentional technologies’ 
that are designed to generate one particular kind of attention – to 
consumption: 
 
the appearance of so-called new media leads 
directly to the hypersocialisation of attention 
through the increasing collaboration among the 
programming industries to capture audiences, to 
the detriment of deep attention                                                              
… very probably correlating with attention deficit 
disorder and infantile hyperactivity. (Stiegler, 
2010: 94) 
 
Not only does this operate socially but, Stiegler argues,  attentional 
technologies also affect the neural functions of the brain by 
interfering with the ‘plastic’ function of synapses. However, because 
of its plasticity the brain remains open to influence. Equally, as 
Stiegler argues in this issue, the ‘pharmacological’ character of 
psychotechnologies leaves open the capacity for a less poisonous 
mobilisation of the recognised potential of digital audiovisual 
culture to re-form the economy and society. 
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In an argument cognate to Stiegler’s (2010) work, provocatively 
entitled What Should We Do with Our Brain?, Catherine Malabou 
(2008) engages with contemporary neuroscience literature to revisit 
the question of the subject, or ‘the self’, in light of the proposition of 
neuroplasticity. Malabou builds on recent neuroscientific 
developments concerning understandings of (neuro)plasticity with 
her own thinking of plasticity through the philosophy of Hegel. As 
the title of her work illustrates, Malabou is interested in the 
philosophical import of the neuroscience of plasticity. For Malabou, 
plasticity provokes ethical and political questions and demands that 
we attend to our neural and cognitive nature(s) in relation to how 
we act. She argues that to consider ‘an ongoing reworking of 
neuronal morphology’ (Malabou, 2008: 25) forces us to think 
beyond the notion of a ‘hard wired’ evolutionary tendency, beyond a 
biological or genetic determinism: 
 
It is precisely because […] the brain is not already 
made that we must ask what we should do with it, 
what we should do with the plasticity that makes 
us, precisely in the sense of a work, sculpture, 
modelling, architecture. (Malabou, 2008: 7) 
 
What is at stake for Malabou (2008) then, as Ian James (2012) 
suggests, is ‘both the plasticity of neuronal self and that of collective 
social and political organisation’ (James, 2012: 100).  While she 
does not directly address attention, Malabou’s argument clearly has 
such capacities at its heart. 
 
Even though Malabou utilises the empirical findings of the ‘hard’ 
sciences, she is at pains to outline how the accounts of 
neuroscientists such as Damasio and Le Doux resort to culturally 
specific notions such as an auto-poetic function in describing how 
consciousness develops by telling itself stories about its own 
‘begetting’ (see Malabou, 2008: 58-62). Consequently, it is 
important to realise that hard science does not simply provide an 
essential epistemological truth about the neuroscientific basis for 
our faculties of attention. On the contrary, Malabou argues it is all 
the more important to critically evaluate the ideological basis for 
scientific and technocultural knowledge production as the 
neurological turn heads in the direction of a cultural and historical 
conception of consciousness. Equally, Isabelle Stengers has 
forcefully argued that scientific ‘truth’ emerges through a shifting 
dialogue between human and non-human assemblages. Again, 
scientific knowledge for Stengers (1997, 2005) does not have a 
 
CROGAN & KINSLEY • PAYING ATTENTION                                 CM 13 • 2012 
 
 
www.culturemachine.net • 14  
special form of access to things in themselves. Nature ‘cannot be 
dominated by a theoretical gaze, but must be explored, with an open 
world to which we belong, in whose construction we participate’ 
(Stengers, 1997: 37). We cannot accordingly exempt our own 
‘nature’, studied by science, from these caveats. In a complementary 
way, Malabou notes that human nature ‘contradicts itself and… 
thought is the fruit of this contradiction’ (2008: 82). Accordingly, 
we can see that it remains important to maintain a healthy 
scepticism about any forceful or unproblematic affirmations of a 
settled neuroscientific basis for the study of attention. 
 
 
Online intelligence 
 
A number of popular commentators have offered arguments 
concerning the effects and potential of the internet that range from 
feeling anxious about a perceived diminishing of attention caused by 
life online, to proposing an emerging capacity for creativity and 
collaboration engendered by network technologies. Amongst the 
anxious are Nicholas Carr, who expresses a technological 
determinist fear of the human subject being rewired by network 
media, and Jaron Lanier, who suggests the ‘hive mind’ of 
participatory media has blunted intelligence through a form of 
‘digital Maoism’.  Amongst those seeking to promote or rehabilitate 
media technologies as a positive supplement to the human are 
Howard Rheingold, who suggests the negative effects of the internet 
are outweighed by the positive if we are mindful in our usage, and 
Clay Shirky, who argues that digital technologies have produced an 
increase in leisure time that creates an untapped cognitive potential 
he calls a ‘cognitive surplus’.   
 
Perhaps the most apprehensive, and widely-read, argument is 
Nicholas Carr’s (2010) The Shallows, in which he argues that the 
internet as a mediator of much of contemporary communication 
engenders particular forms of interaction that are having detrimental 
effects on our mental capacities. In Carr’s thesis, the brain is thus 
rewired by the internet so that users of digital media are rendered 
more efficient automatons for repetitive tasks that require little 
attention, but at the expense of ‘higher’ cognitive faculties: 
  
calm, focused, undistracted, the linear mind is 
being pushed aside by a new kind of mind that 
wants and needs to take in and dole out 
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information in short, disjointed, overlapping 
bursts – the faster the better. (Carr, 2010: 10) 
 
The substantive elements of the argument, as with Hayles’ ‘deep’ 
versus ‘hyper’ attention, are supported by references to work in 
neuroscience.Here again we are faced with the political implications 
of adopting scientific research without reservation, perhaps making 
greater claims of importance than are warranted. Indeed, articles 
within this issue – in particular, the contributions by Bucher and 
Terranova – raise concerns about Carr’s mobilisation of 
neuroscience. 
 
The apparent ‘efficiency’ afforded by the advances of digital media 
within the world of work has been characterised by Shirky as 
productive of a latent potential he calls a ‘cognitive surplus’ (2010). 
According to Shirky’s thesis, we (and the American public in 
particular) have, for some time, been encouraged to squander our 
time and intellect as ‘passive’ consumers. This has produced an 
excess of intellect, energy and time, what Marxists might identify as 
leisure time, which could be put to productive use. Just as Marazzi 
(2008) argues, Shirky, albeit from a very different standpoint, 
suggests that latent leisure time can be put to ‘good’ use in the 
production of value.  His oft-cited example is that of Wikipedia, 
which has been largely created with only one percent of the ‘latent’ 
time and energy of the American populus. Such an argument is of 
course open to Marxist critiques of the appropriation of leisure time 
for production, such as Julian Küklich’s (2005) articulation of 
‘playbour’ and Terranova’s (2000) critique of ‘free labour’.  The 
corollary to this excess, for Marazzi (2008), is that the increase in 
information leads to a greater scarcity of attention. Shirky (2010) 
sees no such diminution of the consumptive capacity; rather, he 
suggests there is only a rise in ‘creativity’.  Following Maurizio 
Lazzarato’s (1996) treatment of ‘immaterial labour’, we might 
understand Shirky’s proposition as forms of life becoming the source 
of innovation. We would thus arrive at the propagation of neoliberal 
biopower in the commodification of life itself, a similar outcome to 
the concerns of Nikolas Rose (2006). 
 
* 
 
Through this introduction to the various ways in which attention 
has been conceptualised and problematised, it should have become 
clear that while there certainly is a broad interest in the capacity for 
attention and its uses, there is by no means a consensus of opinion. 
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The various tropes of attention as commodity, cognitive affordance 
or form of labour offer a fertile ground for further analysis and 
discussion, which is precisely the purpose of this issue.  Thus in the 
final part of this editorial we present a brief discussion of the papers 
we have brought together that collectively offer a critique of an 
‘attention economy’. 
 
 
In this issue 
 
This issue sets itself two interrelated tasks in response to the scope 
and implications of these interrelated positions concerning 
attention, consciousness, culture, economics and politics. Firstly, it 
interrogates the notion of attention as it is elaborated in approaches 
to the attention economy and to media as forms of attention 
capture. The essays by three leading contributors to thinking in and 
around these themes, Bernard Stiegler, Tiziana Terranova, and 
Jonathan Beller, have such an interrogation as their principal task. 
They develop different, overlapping and sometimes contrasting 
perspectives on how a critical reposing of the question of attention 
might reframe its purchase on the central themes of the relation 
between interiority and exteriority, minds and media, economics 
and culture. The interview with Michel Bauwens, and the essays by 
Ben Roberts and Sy Taffel, are also working toward this end in that 
they identify various limitations and exclusions of the predominant 
articulation of the attention economy and move toward alternative, 
more productive, ethical or socially just formulations.  
 
The second task of this issue is pursued in the essays of Tania 
Bucher, Martin Thayne, Rolien Hoyng and the three contributions 
to the additional section of the issue. These three – from Ruth 
Catlow, Constance Fleuriot and Bjarke Liboriussen – represent less 
scholarly but no less acute strategic inquiries into the thinking and 
re-making of what Stiegler calls attentional technics. Together, these 
contributions address particular instantiations of media forms, 
design practices and phenomena – from Facebook and Second Life 
to pervasive media design and Istanbul’s digitally mediated City of 
European Culture project – as a way of exploring and critically 
inflecting the implementation of the attention economy. This 
second mode moves from material phenomena to theoretical 
analysis and critique, while the first goes the other way. As we have 
argued, however, the necessity of the traffic between them is a 
central tenet of how we endeavour to pay attention to contemporary 
digital technoculture in this issue.  
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Stiegler’s essay, ‘Relational Ecology and the Digital Pharmakon’, is 
placed first to indicate the formative role of Stiegler’s philosophy of 
technology in the germination of the critical discussion on what it 
means to ‘pay attention’. From its beginning, his project was 
dedicated to the ‘urgent’ task (as he noted in the preface to Technics 
and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, 1998) of developing a new 
critique of contemporary technoculture, capable of making a 
difference at this specific epoch of what could be called the ‘digital 
transition’. This critique, which has been progressively elaborated in 
a number of books and book series, proceeds from a rigorous 
philosophical redefinition of the human as always composed with its 
technical milieu. As discussed above, human being is ‘essentially’ 
inessential, a contingent, metastable (at best) mix of this artefactual 
exteriority, one which possesses its own dynamic composed with 
that of the human (for now at least). With an interiority that 
imagines and anticipates itself and its future on the basis of the 
memories available to it from out of the past – thanks to what 
Foucault called ‘the archive’ and Heidegger ‘facticity’ – the human 
makes exterior forms that mediate this experience and inflect its 
becoming other. ‘The media’ have become, consequently, a central 
focus of Stiegler’s critique of contemporary technoculture and, in 
particular, of the monopolisation by commercial interests of the 
forms and channels through which interior experience becomes the 
(material) stuff of the collective cultural dynamic.  
 
In the essay presented here, Stiegler argues for the importance of 
approaching attention – that activity of consciousness (interiority) 
before the exterior world – from this perspective in order to 
comprehend the stakes of expansion of the attention economy. 
Drawing on Gilbert Simondon, D. W. Winnicott and others, he 
argues that attention must be thought of as an intrinsically social as 
well as individual psychic act. Attention is not a passive or automatic 
perceptual process, but one that is trained, learnt, and culturally and 
historically – and therefore, technically – conditioned. Stiegler 
reviews Western philosophy and cultural and social history to 
identify the central part played by the grammatising technics of 
graphical, writing and more recently audiovisual media in 
conditioning the ‘attentional forms’ through which the West became 
the global, globalising power that today confronts us with a range of 
crises signalling our possible ‘end’. If, today, ‘attentional’ techniques 
and technics tend to be replaced by industrially mass produced 
‘attentional technologies’ that are designed to generate one 
particular kind of attention – to consumption – this is by no means a 
fait accompli. Stiegler insists on the pharmacological character of the 
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technical provision of our contemporary ‘relational ecology’. This is 
precisely the point and the possibility of paying attention to 
attention: to reanimate the potential for a less poisonous adoption of 
the widely recognised potential of digital audiovisual culture in order 
to re-form (that is, re-mediate) culture, sociality, economy and 
ecology today. 
 
Tiziana Terranova offers a more specific critique of the 
contradictory assumptions subtending the notion of the attention 
economy before developing an alternative account of the ‘social 
brain’. Her argument is not dissimilar in intent to Stiegler’s turn 
toward a Simondonian reposing of attention as the mediated 
relation between individual and collective. Her ‘Attention, Economy 
and the Brain’ identifies the economic logic operative in the 
‘discovery’ of the attention economy by Goldhaber and others as the 
solution to the problem of informational abundance in the mass 
mediated (and then digitally saturated) technoculture of late 
modernity. Attention becomes the new scarce resource which the 
economic must manage, utilise, exchange, distribute and speculate 
upon. Terranova interrogates the dovetailing of this economic 
revaluation of the mental activity of producers and consumers with a 
biopolitical (Jonathan Crary, after Foucault) and neurological 
(Catherine Malabou, N. Katherine Hayles) redefinition and 
institutional reforming of labour, leisure, education and cultural 
production in general. In the second part of the essay, she evokes the 
necessity of thinking the ‘social brain’ by drawing on Stiegler and 
Lazzarato’s recent mobilisation of nineteenth-century French 
sociologist Gabriel Tarde’s critique of the social and cultural damage 
wrought by industrialisation’s deskilling of the labour force and the 
separation of work from the continuity of social and cultural life. 
Tarde’s proposition concerning the brain’s ‘labour of attention’ is 
developed as a means of thinking the always social, outward, 
communicative dimension of the brain’s activity, its constant, 
iterative incorporation of the exterior in its working out of existence. 
The social nature of this attentional labour realises value. The drive 
which animates the proponents of attention economics, namely, to 
capture, quantify, predict and monetise the attention paid by 
individual brains, fails to comprehend this disjunction between the 
economic calculation of the value of attention and the role of 
attention in the very production of the values of the culture upon 
which the economy feeds. 
 
In ‘Wagers Within the Image: Rise of Visuality, Transformation of 
Labour, Aesthetic Regimes’, Jonathan Beller continues and extends 
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his mobilisation of the Marxist traditions of political economic and 
Kulturkritik in a polemical account of the contemporary tendency of 
global capitalist technoculture. Building on his critical account of 
attention economy rhetoric in The Cinematic Mode of Production 
(2006) and earlier work discussed above, Beller develops a 
materialist critique of cognitive capitalism and its economy built on 
visuality, spectacle and the mobilisation of the ‘sensuous labour’ of 
the worker-consumer. If the Soviet avant-garde filmmakers such as 
Eisenstein and Vertov had theorised and experimented with the 
potential of cinema to engineer a new ‘soul’ for the modern worker-
citizen, industrial capitalism had already begun the development of 
the proto-consumer supporting the ongoing expansion of capitalism 
outward geographically as well as across all aspects of lived 
experience through its industrial production of routine experience, 
spectacle and leisure time. This development becomes fully manifest 
in the contemporary passage toward a fully globalised, digital 
mediated realtime, which Beller is at pains to argue is strictly 
correlative to the unprecedented impoverishment and oppression of 
the majority of the world’s population and the exhaustion of its 
natural resources. Insisting on the complicity of all mediated cultural 
production in this destructive dynamic – including scholarship in 
the age of the ‘digital humanities’ where cultural capital 
accumulation threatens the value and viability of critical thought – 
Beller explores the possibilities for responding to or resisting the 
pervasive ‘reconfiguration of subjectivity’ as capitalist commodity. 
His conclusion is that critical theory might do well to pay attention 
to how those excluded (in deed and in thought) from the immaterial 
virtual citizenry of the digital future try to make something of and 
with the digital media designed not for their benefit. Attention to 
what Beller calls an ‘aesthetics of survival’ being developed at the 
limit of what can be represented today might re-open speculation on 
questions of the just, the common, and the care of all beings, older 
questions needing to be remembered and re-posed in light of the 
virtualising logistics of globalisation.   
 
In his interview with Sam Kinsley, Michel Bauwens, co-founder of 
the P2P Foundation, argues that peer-to-peer production represents 
a pathway toward the all-too-evidently necessary reinvention of the 
industrial capitalist economic model. Peer-to-peer is already a 
legitimate description of how the ‘knowledge workers’ of cognitive 
capitalism work, even if their labour takes place in proprietary 
enterprises and is consequently alienated from them in its product’s 
entry into marketing, distribution and intellectual property regimes. 
In Bauwens’ words, ‘the commons creates value and the market 
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captures that value’. He considers historical precedents for the 
increasingly apparent tension between the collective and cultural 
values of peer-to-peer and the capitalist economic system, in, for 
example, the transition from the late Roman empire to the feudal 
system, and from the feudal to the early capitalist one. He 
approaches the contemporary ‘crisis’ moment from a hopeful 
perspective, looking at these past moments as instances of a kind of 
becoming-out-of-phase of the sociocultural with the economic-legal 
regimes which presaged an overturning of the status quo. Bauwens 
surveys different positions within the peer-to-peer movement – such 
as that of Yochai Benkler, the Oekonux group and Dmytri Kleiner – 
concerning the means and logic of a ‘prefigurative politics’ 
promoting or provoking this overturning. Responding to a question 
about how the attention economy notion figures in this account of 
the possible passage to a P2P economy and culture, Bauwens states 
that while there is enormous investment in the commodification of 
attention (along with everything else capable of being thought of as 
‘valuable’ today), there is no reason to think that ‘capitalism has 
won’ because of the success of a platform such as Facebook. Related 
to his thought of how today we live across or between two phases of 
cultural and economic (re)production (and echoing here Stiegler’s 
pharmacological approach), Bauwens argues that we are both ‘de-
commodifying and commodifying today’, and that there is both 
potential and danger in this situation. The Occupy movement 
represents for Bauwens a genuinely novel form of mass political 
action (along with the Pirate Party and the Indignados movements), 
one that operates in the disjunction between the mainstream media 
and the networking, peer-to-peer potential of digital network media. 
These movements more or less consciously adopt an open source, 
peer-to-peer approach to political intervention, and represent a 
prefiguration of the ‘new society’. 
 
In ‘Escaping Attention: Digital Media Hardware, Materiality and 
Ecological Cost’ Sy Taffel argues that the rhetoric of the ‘immaterial’ 
character of the digital technologies of the attention economy elide 
very material concerns. Like Beller’s insistence on paying attention 
to the majority of the global population routinely forgotten in 
discussions of contemporary global technoculture, Taffel makes 
explicit the social and ecological implications of the materiality of 
digital technological production from resourcing, manufacture and 
energy use, to distribution and consumption, through to disposal 
and recycling. Drawing on an ecological conception of media and 
materiality developed through Gregory Bateson’s critical revision of 
the cybernetic tradition and Felix Guattari’s ecophilosophy, and 
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combining the Marxist materialist analysis of industrial production 
with a sense of the global expansion of alienation in the era of what 
Stiegler calls hyper-consumption, Taffel explores several case studies 
which highlight the problematic forgetting of materiality in 
contemporary debates about technoculture. These include the 
exploitative sourcing of rare earth materials (typified by the 
notorious trade in ‘Coltan’ tantalum from the war-torn region of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo), the exploitative just-in-time 
manufacturing processes of the latest consumer electronics in 
various parts of the world (with Apple’s Chinese contractor, 
Foxconn, a recent high profile case), and the exploitative e-waste 
and recycling practices that have evolved with little effective 
regulation or oversight. These serve to remove from view the terrible 
wastage of consumer gadgets by those who can afford them and 
extract what industry is prepared to salvage from them on condition 
that the costs are kept as low as possible. The ecological and human 
costs (in health and social well-being) are borne by the distant 
populations dependent on the revenues from the highly dangerous 
labour of dismantling these gadgets. Taffel makes us consider the 
consequences of these material entailments of the virtual, realtime 
digital technosphere and offers a way of bringing these two aspects 
of global technoculture into a critically conceivable and ethically 
more productive relation.   
 
Ben Roberts examines the free, libre and open source software 
movement (FLOSS) as his contribution to the reevaluation of 
attention economy in this issue. ‘Attention-seeking: Technics, 
Publics and Software Individuation’ resonates with the essays by 
Stiegler and Terranova in identifying the limitations of Goldhaber’s 
economic valuation of attention along the lines of Marx’s account of 
exchange value as the reductive translation and insertion into a 
narrow capitalist economic order of something phenomenally and 
socially more complex. Roberts then examines some influential 
formulations of open source and collaborative software production 
that promote alternative models of attentional forms and their 
development. Christopher Kelty’s Two Bits: The Cultural 
Significance of Free Software (2008) receives the most attention for 
the way it insists on the collective dimension of open software, a 
move which responds to the more individualistic (and politically 
naïve) celebration of autonomous ‘creative labour’ in Yochai 
Benkler’s The Wealth of Networks (2006). Kelty’s notion of software 
production as a ‘recursive’ contribution to the open source 
community’s shared discursive becoming is scrutinised by Roberts. 
Its ambivalent indebtedness to a Habermasian notion of the public 
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sphere is identified as its problematic basis – the problem being that 
software production tends to be treated as a lingua franca for an 
ideal and ideally unified single internet public. This is where Roberts 
turns to Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of technology to point the 
way toward an account of FLOSS’ potential to critically and 
creatively shape the formation of digital attentional forms. This 
account would need to understand software development as a 
process of individuation between individuals and their collectives, 
one always composed with the dynamic of technical individuation in 
which software developers are themselves part of the individuation 
of software ‘individuals’. Software production would be in this 
account both less and more than a recursive contribution to a public 
debate about the future of ‘the’ internet, and its potential to reform 
the milieu of attentional technics could be better assessed from this 
perspective.  
 
Taina Bucher, in her article ‘A Technicity of Attention: How 
Software “Makes Sense”’ offers a sceptical response to the 
neurological turn in the humanities Bucher mobilises an 
understanding of ‘technicity’ to critically examine the internalisation 
of control as ‘governmentality’ (pace Foucault) that underpins the 
specific human-machine assemblages of attention harnessing 
located in Facebook. Through a detailed reading of the specific 
affordances of some core protocols of Facebook, in code and the 
practices they engender, Bucher examines the techno-social 
structure of the attention apparatuses of Facebook. These 
algorithms operate within a form of technicity, which Bucher takes 
to be a ‘coconstitutive milieu of relations between the human and 
their technical supports’ (Crogan and Kennedy, 2009: 109). 
OpenSocial, OpenGraph and GraphRank are examined as particular 
articulations of power, realised in relation between code and subject, 
as the algorithms automate the ‘sense making’ processes of what 
content is ‘relevant’ to a particular user.  Bucher thus identifies this 
marshalling of what is visible, and also invisible, in Facebook as a 
locus of attention as a form of ‘governmentality’, which she takes to 
be the rationalities underlying the techniques for directing human 
behavior (Foucault, 2008).  For Bucher, then, attention is managed 
by Facebook to propagate a certain social order of continued 
participation. 
 
In ‘Friends Like Mine: The Production of Socialised Subjectivity in 
the Attention Economy’, Martin Thayne approaches Facebook 
through the lens of political economy. He interrogates the emerging 
interrelationship between capital, labour, subjectivity and affect 
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which has become increasingly synonymous with a number of 
online social networking technologies and practices. In this regard, 
Thayne analyses the ‘Like’ button as a designed, socio-technological 
interaction which captures the emotive connections and 
engagements produced amongst the multitude of Facebook users. 
The extraordinary, speculative, financial value of such sites are 
‘based’ on how such elements serve its advertising architecture, 
which utilises the information contributed by users (including ‘liked’ 
pages) to deliver more relevant and targeted marketing. Through an 
exploration of the collaborative and socialised modes of subjectivity 
which emerge from the use of the ‘Like’ button and similar tools, 
Thayne suggests that proprietary online social networks are central 
to the commercial subsumption of forms of life itself. This account 
draws on work which aligns the biopolitical production of 
knowledge, desire, attention and sociality with modes of immaterial 
labour. Presented here, then, is a critique of those mechanisms of 
bio- and what Stiegler would call psycho-power which permeate 
Facebook. This critique examines how specific functions, protocols 
and applications may embody the productive power of SNS 
technology in the context of configuring attention and controlling 
social interactions. 
 
Rolien Hoyng in ‘Popping Up and Fading Out: Participatory 
Networks and Istanbul’s Creative City Project’ analyses the 
networks constructed as both a part and result of Istanbul European 
Capital of Culture 2010. Considered as an assemblage, Hoyng 
argues that Istanbul as a Capital of Culture functioned both as an 
attention directing apparatus, with the compulsion of ‘interactivity’ 
as participation, and also as a focal point for resistance. Hoyng’s 
essay focuses on socio-technical forms of governance that targeted 
Istanbul’s transformation into a ‘creative city’ and, in particular, on 
discourses and practices of ‘networking’. For Hoyng, the apparatuses 
of networking are what Stiegler calls ‘psychotechnologies’ that both 
condition and delimit our knowledge, know-how (savoir-faire) and 
our capabilities to care, including ‘taking care’ of ourselves and our 
city (here, Istanbul). Drawing on extensive empirical evidence 
derived from fieldwork, Hoyng critically examines the specific 
practices of networking that stitched together the groups from 
which power over the ‘creative city’ process was exercised and also 
provided a means for resistance. New relations of care among urban 
populations capable of defying regimes of psychopower are unlikely 
to emerge, according to her, from displays of otherness through 
information systems. For Hoyng, these kinds of relation require the 
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cultivation of a multiplicity of attentional forms that mediate care, 
memory, and dialogue and that accommodate different sets of skills. 
 
In the additional section of this issue, artist and arts activist Ruth 
Catlow, architectural design researcher Bjarke Liboriussen and 
Pervasive Media researcher and educator Constance Fleuriot 
consider significant attentional forms and practices in the recent and 
emerging digital media milieu. Liboriussen’s ‘poster’ considers the 
lessons to be learnt from the Second Life ‘bubble’s’ intertwined 
utopianisms of its now exhausted virtual property speculation and its 
promotion of a virtual architectural design experience. The wider 
implications of the technicity of ‘virtual worlds’ are explored in this 
thoughtful contribution. Ruth Catlow of Furtherfield online art 
community discusses We Won’t Fly for Art (2009), a collaborative 
media art project she undertook with co-founder Mark Garrett to 
encourage participants in the international contemporary art 
community to pay attention to the ecological implications of their 
default acceptance of the regime of jetsetting around the 
international exhibition circuit. The project encouraged 26 people 
to sign up and participate in a collaborative reflection on the 
complicity of international art with global capitalism, something that 
is shared by the Furtherfield’s ‘Media Art Ecologies’ programme – of 
which this work was part. In ‘Avoiding Vapour Trails in the Virtual 
Cloud’, Constance Fleuriot gives an account of research workshops 
she conducted at the Digital Cultures Research Centre with 
pervasive media designers in order to develop both a language and 
an ethical perspective – an ethically inflected design language – on 
pervasive media development practice. Pervasive media is rapidly 
moving from the experimental to the commercial development stage 
and soon will be a major form of attentional technics. Using 
Stiegler’s call for a reinvestment in Kant’s notion of enlightenment 
as the entry into ‘majority’ of all, Fleuriot characterises the 
workshops she conducted as dedicated to developing a wider critical 
and ethical engagement of the designers in what they are doing 
(Stiegler, 2010). 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 The European Science Foundation conference, ‘Paying Attention: 
Digital Media Cultures and Intergenerational Responsibility’ 
(www.payingattention.org), was convened by Professor Jonathan 
Dovey and the authors, Digital Cultures Research Centre, 
University of the West of England, Bristol, in September 2010 to 
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gather the input and insights of creative practitioners exploring 
critical and alternative uses of new media forms and technologies. 
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